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Hardware policy, on the other hand, was a primary coverage policy with a
clause restricting it to excess coverage in accidents involving nonowned automobiles. The court reasoned that because American Hardware was a primary
insurer in most situations, the insured's claim must exhaust the American
Hardware policy's limits before collecting under Allstate's excess coverage.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court.
MISCELLANEOUS

In Valtrol, Inc. v. General Connectors Corp., 884 F.2d 149 (4th Cir.
1989), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
whether a supplier's going out of business constituted a breach of an
exclusive distributorship agreement between a national supplier and local
distributor of steam trap equipment. In Valtrol the Bestobell Steam division
of General Connectors Corporation and Valtrol executed a contract in 1984,
extending an exclusive distributorship agreement that had existed between
them since 1979. Under the agreement, Valtrol acquired exclusive rights to
distribute Bestobell products in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, and parts of Tennessee and Texas. The contract also required each
of the parties to use commercially reasonable efforts to promote the Bestobell products. The contract was to be effective through June 30, 1986,
with renewal occurring automatically each July 1 as long as both parties
were performing their obligations. The contract required mutual consent
and ninety days notice for termination and designated Texas law as governing the agreement.
The dispute in Valtrol centered around General Connectors' decision to
discontinue participation in the steam trap market by divesting itself of its
Bestobell products division. The Bestobell products division had been losing
money since 1984. Accordingly, General Contractors notified all of its
distributors, including Valtrol, that all contracts with General Connectors'
Bestobell Steam division would terminate on June 30, 1986. Bestobell made
its final shipment of equipment to Valtrol in August 1986. In November
1986 General Connectors sold the assets of its steam trap division to another
company, making that company the exclusive United States distributor of
Bestobell steam traps.
On February 17, 1987, Valtrol filed a diversity suit against General
Connectors in the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina. Valtrol's complaint included claims for breach of express and
implied warranties, breach of contract, and recoupment. Additionally, Valtrol's complaint sought consequential damages for the cost of cover and
for lost profits. General Connectors counterclaimed against Valtrol alleging
that Valtrol had refused to pay for certain steam equipment purchased from
Bestobell. Valtrol answered General Connectors' counterclaim by contending
that Valtrol was entitled to apply certain product discounts, allegedly given
by General Connectors to help Valtrol establish Texas operations, to offset
Valtrol's obligations to General Connectors on the steam equipment. The
case went before a jury in June 1988.
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During the trial, the district court directed verdicts for General Connectors on fourteen of Valtrol's sixteen claims, including Valtrol's claim for
breach of express and implied warranties. The district court refused to
direct a verdict on Valtrol's claims for breach of the distributorship contract
and recoupment and, therefore, submitted the breach and recoupment claims
to the jury along with General Connectors' counterclaim for payment of
the price of the steam equipment allegedly purchased but not paid for by
Valtrol.
On Valtrol's breach of contract claim the jury returned a verdict in
favor of Valtrol in the amount of $215,000. The jury also found for Valtrol
on General Connectors' counterclaim. The district court, however, granted
General Connectors' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or
for a new trial in the alternative, agreeing with General Connectors' contention that General Connectors' discontinuing the operation of its Bestobell
division did not constitute a breach of the distributorship agreement with
Valtrol. Although the jury denied General Connectors' counterclaim, the
trial court ordered the parties to retry General Connectors' counterclaim
against Valtrol. The trial court reasoned that Valtrol had defended General
Connectors' counterclaim for payment by arguing that General Connectors'
breach of the distributorship agreement destroyed Valtrol's ability to pay.
The district judge ruled that, because of the court's finding that General
Connectors had not breached the distributorship agreement with Valtrol,
the court should set aside the jury's verdict on the counterclaim and order
a retrial of the counterclaim. Valtrol appealed the district court's decision
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit in Valtrol agreed with the district court's conclusion
that Bestobell's cessation of business did not constitute a breach of the
distributorship contract. The Fourth Circuit explained that contracts generally provide stability for business relationships by allocating between the
parties the risks of changing economic conditions. The Fourth Circuit further
explained that if parties to a contract fail to allocate risks of a changing
economy, as did Valtrol and General Connectors, the parties will stand or
fall together in the success or failure of their joint enterprise. Because
Valtrol and General Connectors failed to allocate the risks of either party's
going out of business, the Fourth Circuit concluded that General Connectors
had not breached the distributorship agreement when General Connectors
ceased doing business in the steam trap equipment market.
In determining whether Valtrol and General Connectors had allocated
between themselves the economic risks of the distributorship relationship or
whether the parties would stand or fall together in the distribution enterprise,
the Fourth Circuit looked to the language of the distributorship agreement.
In Valtrol the Fourth Circuit relied on Texas law in interpreting the
distributorship agreement between Valtrol and General Connectors. The
Valtrol court noted that the distributorship agreement between General
Connectors and Valtrol did not expressly require General Connectors to
stay in the steam trap equipment business. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit
observed that the contract did not establish the consequences of General
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Connectors' failure to remain in the steam trap equipment business. The
Fourth Circuit also determined that Valtrol had failed to establish the
existence of an implied covenant between the parties to remain in business.
The Valtrol court reasoned that an inference of an implied covenant to
remain in business was not required to carry out the intent of the parties
and noted that the law generally disfavors implied covenants.
The Fourth Circuit also denied Valtrol's contention that a plain reading
of the contract showed a long-term agreement between the parties to deal
with one another. The Valtrol court likened the distributorship agreement
to an output or requirements contract. Such contracts, the Valtrol court
noted, are not promises to buy or sell a specific amount of goods and do
not contain implied promises that the parties will continue to operate their
businesses under all circumstances. Because the contract between Valtrol
and General Connectors demonstrated no contrary intent, the Fourth Circuit
held that each party bore the risk that the other party would go out of
business.
In Valtrol the Fourth Circuit stressed that the court was not holding
that economic difficulties generally will relieve contractual obligations. Instead, the Fourth Circuit held that a supplier is not liable to a distributor
for going out of business in the absence of contractual intent to the contrary.
The Valtrol court held that the contractual agreement between Valtrol and
General Connectors to use commercially reasonable efforts to promote sales
of steam trap equipment did not constitute a contractual duty to stay in
business. Accordingly, because General Connectors did not breach the
distributorship contract, the Fourth Circuit ruled that Valtrol could not
recover consequential damages for cover and lost profits.
The Fourth Circuit next considered Valtrol's contention that Valtrol
was entitled to a new trial on its claim for recoupment damages. The court
described the function of the recoupment doctrine as providing a remedy if
a supplier requires a distributor to make a substantial investment to establish
the distributorship and then terminates the relationship without just cause,
leaving the distributor with heavy unrecouped expenditures. The Valtrol
court, however, noted that the recoupment remedy is unavailable if a party
terminates a distributorship agreement with just cause. Based on the earlier
ruling that General Connectors was under no duty to continue to operate
its Bestobell division, the Fourth Circuit held that Valtrol could not use the
recoupment doctrine to alter the allocation of risks to which the parties had
agreed and denied Valtrol a new trial on Valtrol's recoupment claim.
Having rejected Valtrol's breach of contract claim, the Fourth Circuit
next considered Valtrol's claim that the trial court erred in limiting Valtrol's
damages for breach of warranty to repair and replacement costs. The
distributorship agreement expressly limited warranty damages to repair and
replacement and conspicuously and specifically disclaimed all implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. Despite the express limitations in the
distributorship agreement, Valtrol contended that subsequent dealings of
the parties had modified or overridden the agreement and that the Uniform
Commercial Code's implied warranties of quality became a part of the new
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contract by operation of law. The Fourth Circuit rejected Valtrol's argument
and held that the express limitation of warranty contained in the distributorship agreement controlled the transactions in question and, therefore,
precluded Valtrol's claim for incidental and consequential damages. The
Valtrol Court rejected Valtrol's argument that subsequent dealings between
Valtrol and General Connectors had modified the terms of the distributorship agreement because Valtrol's argument would have sanctioned Valtrol's
unilateral imposition of contract terms that contradicted express warranty
provisions in Valtrol's agreement with General Connectors.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit considered General Connectors' counterclaim
against Valtrol. The counterclaim alleged that Valtrol had purchased steam
equipment from the Bestobell division of General Connectors and had
refused to pay for the equipment. Valtrol argued that the price of the
equipment did not constitute a debt but rather reflected an incentive that
General Connectors provided to Valtrol for the development of new sales
territories. The Fourth Circuit court noted that General Connectors had not
requested a new trial on the counterclaim in General Connectors' post-trial
motion. Moreover, the Valtrol court observed that, although a district court
has the power to order a new trial on the court's own initiative, the district
court must give notice and an opportunity to be heard to the interested
parties. Because the district court failed to give Valtrol the opportunity to
address the sufficiency of the jury's verdict, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court's grant of a new trial and reinstated the jury's verdict in favor
of Valtrol on the counterclaim.
Accordingly, in Valtrol the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of General Connectors' motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on Valtrol's breach of contract claim and reversed the district court's
grant of a new trial on General Connectors' counterclaim. The Fourth
Circuit also denied Valtrol's bid for a new trial on Valtrol's recoupment
claim and affirmed the district court's directed verdict against Valtrol's
claim for incidental and consequential damages resulting from General
Connectors' alleged breach of warranty.
In Jones v. General Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 22 (4th Cir. 1988), the
Fourth Circuit considered whether Virginia Code section 8.01-35.1 (1984),
which preserves a plaintiff's right to sue joint tortfeasors even after the
plaintiff has released one or more of the joint tortfeasors from liability,
requires that a release from liability be written. The plaintiff in Jones,
Jones, was injured in an automobile accident with Pamela Brown on May
3, 1983. In April 1985 Jones settled his claim with Brown's insurance
company. Jones then orally agreed to release Brown from any further
liability arising out of the accident.
Jones subsequently filed suit in state court against General Motors,
Potomac Leasing, and Moore Cadillac, alleging breach of warranty and
negligence. Jones claimed that the collapse of the front seat of the Cadillac
he was driving at the time of the accident worsened his injuries. Potomac
Leasing and Moore Cadillac settled with Jones; General Motors removed
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the case to federal court and named Brown as a third party defendant. In
September 1987 Jones executed a written release absolving Brown of all
liability. This release expressly reserved Jones's right to sue General Motors.
The release also purported to fall under section 8.01-35.1 of the Virginia
Code.
General Motors and Brown moved for summary judgment before the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. General
Motors argued that the 1987 written release was ineffective because Jones's
1985 oral release of Brown operated under the common law to release all
joint tortfeasors from further liability to Jones. The court denied the
motions, but upon General Motors' and Brown's motions for reconsideration, the court held that Jones's 1985 oral promise had released all joint
tortfeasors from liability because Jones did not execute the release in
accordance with section 8.01-35.1 of the Virginia Code. Jones appealed
from the order granting General Motors' and Brown's motions for summary
judgment.
To resolve the issue, the Fourth Circuit first examined the legislature's
intent in enacting section 8.01-35.1. Specifically, the court considered whether
an agreement must be in writing to fall under section 8.01-35.1. Because
the section effectively displaced the common law, the Jones court adhered
to the principle of strict statutory construction. Analyzing the plain language
of the statute, the court found that section 8.01-35.1, which provides that
releases and covenants not to sue must be executed, requires a written
agreement. The court listed several other examples of language in the statute
that evince a writing requirement: "unless its terms so provide;" "any
amount stipulated by the covenant or the release;" and releases "shall not
be admitted into evidence, [though they] shall be considered by the court."
The court held that strict construction, as well as the plain language of
section 8.01-35.1, requires that a release be in writing for the section to
apply to the release.
The Jones court listed several benefits of a written, as opposed to an
oral, agreement: 1) ensuring that all parties understand who the agreement
releases from liability and what the party paid as consideration for the
release; 2) notifying those tortfeasors whom the injured party still might
sue; 3) eliminating the need to litigate the validity and effect of the release;
and 4) minimizing the possibility of confusion or collusion as to the terms
of an earlier agreement.
Applying its interpretation of section 8.01-35.1 to the Jones facts, the
Fourth Circuit held that Jones's 1985 oral release of Brown operated under
the common law to release all other joint tortfeasors, including General
Motors, from liability. The court rejected Jones's argument that, pursuant
to section 8.01-35.1, the subsequent written release of Brown preserved
Jones's right to sue General Motors. Section 8.01-35.1 provides that a
person must execute a release in good faith. The court found that Jones
did not execute his 1987 written release in good faith because he executed
the release after the statute of limitations had run on his cause of action
against Brown and after Jones had filed suit against General Motors. The
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court implied that Jones wrote the release to comply with section 8.01-35.1
in hopes of preserving a cause of action against General Motors. The Fourth
Circuit, therefore, affirmed the district court's judgment that granted General Motors' and Brown's motions for summary judgment against Jones.
In Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989), the
Fourth Circuit decided whether the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may
consider judicial awards of back pay and liquidated damages as income for
tax purposes. Dorothy Thompson contended that the IRS should not tax
back pay as income. The IRS asserted that the statutory definition of
income includes both back pay and liquidated damages.
In 1973 Thompson sued her employer asserting sex discrimination claims
under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C.A. section 206(d) (West 1978)
and title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. sections 2000e2000e-17 (West 1981). The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held for Thompson and awarded Thompson $66,795.19 in back
pay under the Equal Pay Act and title VII, and $66,135.27 in liquidated
damages under the Equal Pay Act. Thompson v. Boyle, 499 F. Supp. 1147
(D.D.C. 1979), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nom. Thompson v.
Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
On Thompson's 1982 federal income tax return, Thompson reported
the back pay award but not the liquidated damages award as income. The
IRS audited Thompson, determined that the liquidated damages award was
income, and assessed a deficiency. Thompson petitioned the tax court for
a redetermination of the deficiency and sought a refund, claiming that the
back pay award was excludable from her income. The tax court ruled that
the back pay award, but not the liquidated damages award, was includable
in income. The IRS appealed from the tax court's decision, arguing that
the liquidated damages award constituted income. Thompson cross-appealed
and claimed that an award of back pay was not includable in her income.
The Fourth Circuit initially considered the definition of income under
the Internal Revenue Code (the Code). Section 61(a) of the Code, 26
U.S.C.A. section 61(a) (West 1988), provides that gross income includes
"all income from whatever source derived." The Thompson court found,
however, that code section 104(a)(2), 26 U.S.C.A. section 104(a)(2) (West
1988), provides an exception to the general definition of income for "the
amount of any damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness." Treasury Regulation 1.104-1(c), 26 C.F.R. section 1.104-1(c) (1988),
defines "damages received" as "an amount received through prosecution
of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort-type rights." The Thompson
court noted that, although the Code fails to define "personal injuries,"
many courts have held that "personal injuries" are not strictly limited to
physical injury. The Thompson court also stated that courts have distinguished between personal and nonpersonal injuries. The Fourth Circuit,
thus, considered whether Thompson's awards of back pay and liquidated
damages were awards for personal injuries.
The Fourth Circuit initially found that the right to be free from
unreasonable gender discrimination is a personal right and, therefore, that
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damages awarded for violation of that right are damages for personal
injuries. The Fourth Circuit, however, determined that the award of back
pay was not a payment for a tort-type right. The Thompson court reasoned
that back pay is similar to reimbursement for a contract violation. The
court found that Thompson simply received pay for services performed, not
compensation for the tortious actions of a defendant.
The Fourth Circuit then held that Thompson's liquidated damages award
was not earned income because such an award constitutes compensation
received through a tort-type of action. As well as compensating Thompson
for the discriminatory acts of Thompson's employer, the Thompson court
asserted that the award of liquidated damages served to ensure future
compliance with the Equal Pay Act. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, ruled
that an award of back pay is not income because such an award essentially
arises out of a contract claim for accrued wages. The Fourth Circuit further
ruled that an award of liquidated damages is not income because that award
results from a tort-type claim for personal injury. The Fourth Circuit,
consequently, reversed the tax court's decision on both issues.
In United States v. Wagstaff, 865 F.2d 626 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 518 (1989), the Fourth Circuit considered whether evidence in a bank
robbery case under 18 U.S.C. section 2113(a) (1982) was sufficient to show
a taking by intimidation. In Wagstaff the defendant, Raymond Wagstaff,
was arrested and charged with the robbery of the Baltimore City Irvington
Federal Savings and Loan Association (the S & L). According to the court,
the evidence at trial showed that the defendant entered the S & L, put on
a ski mask and sunglasses, and began taking money from a teller's open
cash drawer. The court stated that the defendant did not have a weapon,
said nothing, presented no written note, and made no overtly threatening
gestures. A teller testified that she was afraid.
After trial in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, a jury found the defendant guilty of bank robbery in violation
of 18 U.S.C. section 2113(a) (1982), bank larceny in violation of 18 U.S.C.
section 2113(b) (1982), and entry into a bank with intent to steal in violation
of 18 U.S.C. section 2113(a) (1982). The defendant appealed, arguing that
the evidence presented was insufficient to show a taking by intimidation as
required to prove bank robbery and, therefore, that the district court should
have granted the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the
bank robbery charge.
To resolve the issue, the Fourth Circuit determined that intimidation
occurs if the defendant's conduct is reasonably calculated to produce fear.
The court explained that intimidation requires that an ordinary, reasonable
person must be able to infer a threat of bodily harm from the defendant's
actions. In reaching its decision, the court rejected a Tenth Circuit opinion
that found sufficient evidence of intimidation from the defendant's forceful
and purposeful acts alone, in the absence of any explicit threat of harm or
implicit threat of a weapon. The Fourth Circuit argued that the Tenth
Circuit's reasoning substituted a set of assumptions about the behavior of
any person taking money from a bank. The Fourth Circuit rejected any
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presumption of intimidation whenever a bank robbery occurs, as such a
presumption would in effect eliminate the requirement that the government
prove intimidation as a separate element of the crime of bank robbery.
Applying the Fourth Circuit's definition of intimidation to the Wagstaff
case, the court found that, as a matter of law, the evidence presented was
insufficient to show a taking by intimidation because Wagstaff did not
explicitly threaten harm or have a weapon. The court held that the district
court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal
on the bank robbery charge and reversed Wagstaff's conviction on that
count. The court, however, affirmed without discussion the defendant's
convictions on bank larceny and entry into a bank with intent to steal. The
United States Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for certiorari.
In United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989), the Fourth Circuit considered whether,
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. sections 9601-9657 (1982) (CERCLA), the
United States and the State of South Carolina retroactively could hold site
owners of a hazardous waste disposal facility and generators of hazardous
waste disposed at that facility jointly and severally liable for costs accrued
for the partial removal of hazardous waste from the disposal facility. The
defendants, Seidenburg and Hutchinson (the site owners), leased to Columbia Organic Chemical Corporation (COCC) a four-acre tract of land in
Columbia, South Carolina. In the mid-1970s, after expanding its business,
COCC incorporated South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc. (SCRDI)
for the purpose of assuming COCC's waste handling business. Thereafter,
the site owners received lease payments from SCRDI. SCRDI contracted
with numerous off-site waste producers, including Allied Corporation, Monsanto Company, and EM Industries, Inc. (collectively, the generator defendants), for the transport, recycling, and disposal of chemical and other
waste. Between 1976 and 1980, SCRDI deposited on the Columbia site large
amounts of hazardous substances from the generator defendants. The waste,
contained in drums and other containers, leaked and seeped into the ground.
Subsequently, the site owners became aware that the generator defendants
were disposing hazardous waste at the Columbia site.
In 1980 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) investigated the
site and concluded that the site posed a major fire hazard. Subsequently,
the United States filed suit for injunctive relief under section 7003 of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. section 6973 (1982)
(RCRA), against COCC, SCRDI, and Seidenberg. Thereafter, the state of
South Carolina intervened as a plaintiff and together with the United States
government (the governments) notified the generator defendants, other offsite waste disposers, and the site owners that they potentially were responsible under section 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. section 9607(a) (1982),
for the costs of cleanup at the waste disposal site. Several of the defendants
elected to settle with the governments, but the generator defendants and
the site owners did not settle.
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After notifying the parties of potential CERCLA liability, the governments contracted with a private corporation to clean up the Columbia site.
After the first phase of the cleanup was completed, the EPA inspected the
site and determined that the site contained various hazardous substances of
the same type that the generator defendants were known to have shipped
to the site, and that drums and containers labelled with the insignia of the
generator defendants remained at the site. Thereafter, the governments
completed the site cleanup using federal funds from the Hazardous Substances Response Trust Fund (Superfund) and state money from the South
Carolina Hazardous Waste Contingency Fund, as well as state matching
funds.
To obtain reimbursement for cleanup expenses, in 1982 the governments
filed suit under section 107(a) of CERCLA in the United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina. The governments alleged that the
generator defendants and the site owners jointly and severally were liable
under section 107(a) of CERCLA for the costs the governments expended
completing the surface cleanup of the Columbia site. The site owners
contended that, because they were absentee landloroIs, they were unaware
of the waste disposal activities on their land and that their lease with COCC
did not allow COCC or SCRDI to store chemical waste at their site. The
site owners admitted that since 1977 they knew of the waste disposal activities
and that they continued to accept lease payments until 1980. The generator
defendants claimed that none of their specific waste materials contributed
to the hazardous conditions at the Columbia site and that retroactive
imposition of CERCLA liability was unconstitutional. In addition, the
generator defendants asserted an affirmative defense under section 107(b)(3)
of CERCLA by showing that unrelated third parties solely caused the harm
at the site.
In considering the defendants' claims, the district court rejected the site
owners' innocent landowner defense and concluded that ownership of the
property at the time hazardous substances were stored on the property was
sufficient to hold the site owners liable. Further, the district court both
concluded that the governments did not have to prove that the generator
defendants' specific waste contributed to the harm at the site and rejected
the generator defendants' constitutional arguments. Thus, the district court
held that the environmental harm at the Columbia site was indivisible and
that the site owners and the generator defendants jointly and severally were
liable under CERCLA for cleanup costs. Accordingly, the district court
granted the governments' motion for summary judgement and ordered the
generator defendants and the site owners to pay the full amount of the
cleanup costs. However, the district court denied the governments' request
to add prejudgment interest to the amount owed.
The generator defendants and site owners appealed the district court's
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The
generator defendants, arguing that because the governments failed to establish a nexus between the generator defendants' specific waste and the harm
at the site, claimed that the district court improperly imposed liability under
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CERCLA. The site owners argued that they were innocent landowners under
section 107(b)(3) of CERCLA and, therefore, that the district court wrongly
precluded them from presenting evidence of the innocent landowner defense.
In considering the site owners' claims, the Fourth Circuit first noted
that section 107(a)(2) of CERCLA imposes strict liability on owners of
waste disposal facilities, regardless of the owners' degree of participation in
the subsequent disposal of hazardous waste. Further, the Fourth Circuit
stated that to establish the affirmative defense under section 107(b) of
CERCLA, the site owners must establish the absence of a direct or indirect
contractual relationship with persons solely responsible for the release or
threatened release of hazardous substances at the Columbia site, as well as
demonstrate that the site owners took precautionary action against the
foreseeable consequences of the waste disposal actions of the generator
defendants. The Fourth Circuit found that, because the site owners had
entered a lease agreement with COCC and had accepted rent from both
COCC and SCRDI, the site owners had maintained a contractual relationship with persons responsible for the release or threatened release of
hazardous substances at the Columbia site. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
held that the site owners failed to meet the first prong of the affirmative
defense because the site owners could not establish the absence of a direct
or indirect contractual relationship with persons solely responsible for the
release or threatened release of hazardous substances at the Columbia site.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit found that the site owners had wilfully
and negligently ignored the waste disposal conduct of COCC and SCRDI
on the site owners' property. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the site
owners failed to meet the second prong of the affirmative defense because
the site owners failed to present evidence that they took precautionary action
against the foreseeable conduct of COCC and SCRDI. Thus, the Fourth
Circuit held that, because the site owners owned the Columbia facility and
because hazardous wastes were released from the facility during the site
owners' period of ownership, the site owners were liable under CERCLA.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against the site owners.
In considering the generator defendants' liability, the Fourth Circuit
addressed the generator defendants' argument that section 107(a)(3) of
CERCLA requires the governments to prove a nexus between the waste the
generator defendants sent to the site and resulting environmental harm. The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the phrase "such hazardous substances" in
section 107(a)(3) denotes hazardous substances alike or similar to those
found in the generator defendants' waste, or substances that the mixture of
the generator defendants' waste and other waste from the site could have
produced. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that, because Congress
realized the technological infeasibility of tracing each chemical to its source,
requiring the governments to trace the ownership of each generic chemical
found at the site would be adverse to Congress's intent to facilitate prompt
correction of hazardous waste disposal. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
agreed with the district court's determination that proof that the government
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found hazardous substances at the disposal site "like" those contained in
the generator defendants' waste is sufficient to assess liability under CERCLA.
In considering the defendants' challenge to the district court's imposition
of joint and several liability, the Fourth Circuit stated that federal common
law allows for the imposition of joint and several liability in cases of
indivisible harm. The Fourth Circuit stated that the defendants have the
burden of establishing a reasonable basis for apportioning the harm between
the responsible parties. The Fourth Circuit added, however, that the defendants failed to meet their burden because the defendants failed to submit
either evidence showing a relationship between waste volume, the release of
hazardous substances, and harm at the site, or evidence disclosing the
individual and interactive qualities of the substances deposited there. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court properly imposed
joint and several liability on the defendants.
In considering the defendants' constitutional claim, the Fourth Circuit
considered whether retroactive application of CERCLA survives the Supreme
Court's test for due process validity. The Fourth Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court previously rejected an analogous due process challenge to
the retroactive application of the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, on the
grounds that the retroactive provisions of the Black Lung Benefits Act
rationally were related to the valid legislative purpose of spreading the costs
of employees' disabilities. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the retroactive
CERCLA provisions similarly were related to the valid legislative purpose
of spreading the costs of environmental damage to those persons who
profited from the inexpensive waste disposal methods that caused the
environmental damage. Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that CERCLA's
retroactive liability provisions were valid under the due process clause.
Further, in response to the defendants' claim that CERCLA unconstitutionally acted as an ex post facto law, the Fourth Circuit noted that CERCLA
does not impose punishment, but rather imposes a reimbursement obligation.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that, because constitutional prohibitions
against ex post facto laws were limited to those laws that impose punishment,
CERCLA was not an unconstitutional ex post facto law. Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment
against the generator defendants.
In response to the governments' cross-appeal claim that the district
court erred in denying prejudgment interest on the response costs the
generator defendants and site owners owe to the governments, the Fourth
Circuit noted that, subsequent to the district court's decision, Congress had
amended section 107(a) to allow the imposition of prejudgment interest.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to
determine whether prejudgment interest may be awarded in the instant case.

